CHINA : THREAT TO SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY?

	Modernisation of the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA)
	It is premature to conclude that China’s posses hostile intent once it engages in the modernisation of it’s military capabilities. By examining the modernisation vis-à-vis China’s security perception, change in military mission/doctrine, replacement of obsolete equipment, unresolved territorial disputes and supply-side pressures, we can have a clearer perspective on the rerasons of the PLA’s arm’s modernisation. China’s Security Perception Security perspectives reflect the ways in which nations view war and peace, perceive and define external threats, adopt appropriate national strategies and determine national resources. It is within these broader contexts that defence doctrines are determine, priorities set, policy options formulated and adopted, and specific programs chosen²². China is no exception. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the initiatives to push for stability along it’s borders with the newly CIS, India, Myanmar and Russia²³, China’s security environment is marked by the absence of external threats. At the same time, the international competition is changing from military to economic and technological areas. Research projects such as “China’s Defence in the Year 2000” conducted in 1987 and comment by Deng Xiaoping in 1988 that “science and technology is the foremost important production force” had resulted in re-orientation of China’s national strategies. Within this re-orientation, national defence would take a more science-and-technology path towards modernisation²⁴. China recognised that with the global economic gravity shifting to the Asia-Pacific areas, it needs to cope with the dynamics of global economic changes, enter international economic and political competition. It would have to integrate strategies of security and development; to change the strategic focus towards maritime and towards the Asia-Pacific region; and to modify China’s military strategy. The last point requires that the focus be shifted from a land-force to air-sea deterrence posture, and the extension of integrated Airforce-Navy deterrence to the blue waters for China broader national interests²⁵.
	22. Jing-Dong Yuan & Yuchao Zhu, op.cit., p. 233. 23. Barbara Opall, “ China Widens Global Reach”, Defence News, vol. 12, no. 4, 1997, Straits Times, “Accord On Former Sino-Soviet Border Signed”, 25 April 97. 24. Jing-Dong Yuan and Yuchao Zhu, op.cit., p. 235. 25. Ibid., p. 236
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