|
After
the Tianamen crisis in 1989, China’s defence expenditure has been
increasing from 29 billion Yuan in 1990 to 63.1 billion Yuan in 1995
(see table 1). Increases from 1992 to 1993 appeared to be geared towards
acquisition of modern weapons, however, several US intelligence studies
have argued that the increased defence budget allocation could also be
used for preparing for internal security problems9.
Nevertheless, it is perceived that the overall increases in China’s
defence spending are to compensate for years of low defence spending
during the 1980s where the Chinese simply cannot afford it; offset the
effects of inflation (which was 20% in the last several years and as
high as 33% in 1991) and improve the quality of life for the forces. It
is also very likely that some of the increases are channeled towards
“rewarding” the PLA in crushing the 1989 Tianamen incident. The
crisis established the role of the PLA
as the “party’s army” over it’s role as the “people
army”. The Communist leadership is probably more aware of the need to
assure the loyalty of the PLA cadres.
Table
1.
:
China’s Military Expenditure as a
percentage of the Gross
Domestic Production (1986 to 1995)
|
Year
|
ME
Yuan (Bn)
|
GDP
Yuan (Bn)
|
%
|
Year
|
ME
Yuan (Bn)
|
GDP
Yuan
(Bn)
|
%
|
|
1986
|
20.1
|
946
|
2.1
|
1991
|
33.0
|
1976
|
1.7
|
|
1987
|
21.0
|
1093
|
1.9
|
1992
|
37.8
|
2394
|
1.6
|
|
1988
|
21.8
|
1402
|
1.6
|
1993
|
42.6
|
3151
|
1.4
|
|
1989
|
25.1
|
1591
|
1.6
|
1994
|
55.1
|
4380
|
1.3
|
|
1990
|
29.0
|
1740
|
1.7
|
1995
|
63.1
|
4507
|
1.4
|
|