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China’s defence spending is low in terms of both relative
proportions and absolute terms. Defence spending accounted for 5.6% of
the GDP in 1979 but dropped to only 1.3 % in 1994. This compares
favorably with 4.2 % for US, 3.6% for UK and 3.18 % in France.
China’s defence spending was 9.5% of the national spending in 1994
as compared to 18.9% in US, 9.64% in UK and 13.6% in France10.
It’s military expenditure as a percentage of it’s GDP and national
spending is therefore steady and lower than other developed Western
countries.
Research
has indicated that increase in defence expenditure is due to the rate
of increase in GDP and arms import will tend to rise if GDP rises as
the nation becomes richer. Increased defence expenditure do not
necessarily indicate arms purchases. Arms purchases alone do not
signify offensive acquisitions and offensive acquisitions need not
represent any impending hostility11.
By just estimating China’s defence expenditure separated from it’s
national military strategy, doctrine and concepts of operations is of
limited value in understanding Beijing’s defence priorities and
capabilities. The margin of error remains too great for any meaningful
conclusions12. |
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10.
Xinhua
News Agency (Beijing), “China White Paper - November 1995”, 16 November
1996.
11.
Bunn Nagara, “The Notion of an Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, vol. 17, no. 2, September 95, p. 194.
12.
Paul
H.B.Godwin, “PLA incorporated, Estimating China’s military
expenditure”, in Chinese
Economic Reforms, The Impact on Security, edited by Gerald Segal
and Richard H. Yang (London and New York : Routledge, 1996). |
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