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It
is unlikely that China will use it’s nuclear arsenals in the
Asia-Pacific region. In terms of conventional forces, it is evident
that the PLA can capably operate along or within their national
borders. While recent PLA inquiries abroad about the purchase of
advanced weaponry and military technology have generated much
publicity, actual procurements and their effects on overall combat
effectiveness have been minor. For instance, compare the
one-squadron-size force of 26 Su-27s acquired from Russia with 72 F16s
in South Korea or 54 F15C/D in Japan18.
fielded by the United States. Even in the next decade, the Chinese
will continue to have severe limitations in electronic warfare,
command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) and
joint force doctrine19. Coupled
with the small number of platforms, the C3I and
effectiveness of the newly acquired assets will be problematic and
limited.
The Su-27 represents the only highly capable system in the
Chinese air force inventory; full exploitation of it’s capability
remains a distant goal.
Another
deficiency of the PLA's capacity is China’s weak indigenous
technological and industrial base. Chinese military R&D,
production technologies, and weapon systems generally lagged 10 to 20
years behind the West and Japan. Whether China can eventually close
the technology gap is not in question, the point is that the process
will be a protracted one20.
The PLA lacks the capability and sustainability in power projection
and hold territories in the South China Sea21.
In short, the PLA is only likely to present a limited threat to some
of it’s neighbours (those bordering China) in the next decade. |
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18.
IISS,
op.cit., pp. 30-31.
19.
Paul Dibb,
“Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia”, ADELPHI Paper 295, The Institute for Strategic Studies, (Oxford
University Press, 1995), p. 87.
20.
Karl W. Eikenberry, op.cit.,
p. 88.
21
Ron
Montaperto, “China as a Military Power”, Strategic
Forum, no. 56, December 1995, p. 3-4. Ronald N Montaperto and Karl
Eikenberry, “ Appraising China’s Military Power”,
Harvard Journal of International Relations, February 1996. |
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